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  Following Tarski’s truth-definition and consequence-definition papers [3, pp. 152–278, 409–
420], we assume an interpreted formalized language: a first-order language interpreted 
number-theoretically. We use ordinary variable-enhanced English: for example, the English 
sentence schema ‘every number x is such that P(x)’ translates the first-order schema ‘x P(x)’. 
  As usual, a deduction is a rule-governed list of sentences beginning with premises and ending 
with a conclusion. A system of deductions is truth-preserving if each of its deductions having 
true premises has a true conclusion [3, p. 167]—and consequence-preserving if, for any given 
set of sentences, each deduction having premises that are consequences of that set has a  
conclusion that is a consequence of that set [2, p.15]. Consequence-preserving amounts to: in 
each of its deductions the conclusion is a consequence of the premises. The same definitions 
apply to deduction rules considered as systems of deductions. 
  Every consequence-preserving system is truth-preserving. It is not as well-known that the 
converse fails: not every truth-preserving system is consequence-preserving [2, Appendix]. In 
ordinary first-order Peano-Arithmetic, the induction rule yields the conclusion ‘every number x 
is such that: x is zero or x is a successor’—which is not a consequence of the null set—from 
two tautological premises, which are consequences of the null set, of course. 
  Truth-preserving rules not consequence-preserving are non-logical or extra-logical rules [1, 
§4.1]. Such rules are unacceptable to persons espousing traditional truth-and-consequence 
conceptions of demonstration [2, p.16]: a demonstration shows its conclusion is true by 
showing that its conclusion is a consequence of premises already known to be true. 
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